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Showing posts with label J.S.H.I.T. #1. Show all posts
Showing posts with label J.S.H.I.T. #1. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

Time Doesn't Matter in NJ District Court


The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden, that is, is so hubristic that time doesn't really matter there and here's quick proof.

We discussed the (JSHIT) the Clerk of the Court in the above court in the above court utilize within my post entitled "Clerk ofCourt can Rubber Stamp or Initiate (JSHIT)."  Guess what folks, it's still the practice of the day there.
 Anyone filing a document there will tell you that it's always "8:30" in Camden.  I was just there on Friday, July 27, to file my motion for a jury trial, and this practice was further revealed. Not all of my viewers know that I'm back on my job, making injustice known, but maybe some of them picked up this fact within the copy of the letter that I wrote to Judge Hillman. (See SwimmingWith the So Called Judicial Sharks)

On the third page of the above cover letter I submitted to the Clerk of the court, I wrote, "As my last filing was scheduled within 33 min. of me leaving your office please tend to this matter in the same, and acknowledge by return of "Notice of Filing," and a copy of the docket sheet for 08cv02407." 

Amazingly federal rule of civil procedure 5 (d) (4) Acceptance by the Clerk, was adhered to and the clerk did not refuse to file my paper, even though the court is presenting that the case is closed.  Don't believe me?  Look at the photo of page 15 of the docket sheet below.  Docket entry 80 says: "ORDERED that the Clerk shall Close the file…"
 Back up speedy, we were talking about the time clock thing remember.  Well take a look in the bottom right hand corner and you will see that the computer stamp says that this document was printed at 12:57PM.  I didn't quite get the fast 33 min. attention I got before but considering that I left Atlantic City on the 10:10AM bus, arrived in Camden a little after 11AM, was able to walk back to the Camden bus terminal and catch the 11:35 AM bus back to Atlantic City, and by the time I got off the bus my motion was filed.
 Back up again speedy, you might have missed it.  The Clerk of the Court stamped the cover letter as "RECEIVED JUL 27 2012 AT 8:30,"  at the penalty of perjury I'm telling you that I didn't leave to go to the court till 10:10AM, so how did my paper get stamped at 8:30AM, before I got there, Hmm.  Some one is pulling your chain or the judicial officer must be playing with their "ding-a-lings" instead of doing there ministerial duties with integrity.

But you be the Judge, I'll start putting together some shocking misconduct that you'll have to look at the documents and judge for yourselves.  So practice with this one, take your time, look over the documentary evidence, but hurry up...and I'll do the same with exposing the real Judicial Stealthy Hubristic Injustice Tactics of Judges Noel L. Hillman and Karen M. Williams.
 If time matters to you, please take a few minutes to share this with a friend or two.  It's your judicial system too, time does matter, and it's time that you judge the judges.

Thank you for viewing,
The Casino Gaming Oracle

P.S. I will be re-posting the above document so they will be larger, promise it'll be worth the wait!

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

Analysis of Third Circuit Case Law on Recusal Standards (part 2)


As promised from "Analysis of Third Circuit Case Law on Recusal Standards" I have returned to share more case law that Judge Noel L. Hillman thumbs his nose to, and or is willfully ignorant of.

In the above post we looked at the 1989 case of U.S. v. Furst 886 F.2d 558.  Here, lets take a look at the 1976 case that was decided on September 1, 1976, Mims v. Sharp, 541 F. 2d 415, 416.  Within that case at page 416 Judge Gibson wrote:

"That fourth contention is that in ruling on appellants' motion to disqualify himself the district judge applied the wrong legal standard under 28 U.S.C. § 144. We agree, and conclude that all proceedings from December 10, 1974, the date of the § 144 motion, must be vacated and the case returned to the district court for reassignment to a different judge."
 I'll trust that if there are any lawyer out there that disagree with my understanding of this case, they will comment in correction below.  I understand the above case to say that after properly applying the standards under 28 U.S.C. § 144, the above court agreed with the petitioner and held the all proceedings from 12/10/1974, the date that the § 144 motion was filed, must be vacated.  The above court further said that because the judge misapplied § 144 the case would be returned to the district court and reassigned to a different judge.

How many remember that in the 12th paragraph of "Analysis of Third Circuit Case Law on Recusal Standards" I referred to Judge Hillman's March 28, 2012, opinion as invalid?   All those trained in the law, please correct me if I'm wrong.  If I filed my recusal motion on January 18, 2012, seeking the recusal of Judges Noel L. Hillman and Karen M. Williams from civil actions 08-cv-02407 and 11-cv-06304, Judge Noel L. Hillman should not have proceeded and further in civil action 08-cv-02407, correct?

Well lets see, the cover letter that I shared with everyone substantiates that I was at the clerks desk on 1/18/2012. I discussed this fact in detail within the post entitled "Hickson vs. Hillman's & Williams' (JSHIT)." That post also has a direct link to a copy of the cover letter also.  But…

There will be some nay-sayer's that will say that there is one key element that's missing, and that would be the appearance that the motion for recusal was filed in regards to civil action 11-cv-06304. Well lets take a closer look, because correct me if I'm wrong again but Noel L. Hillman was put on notice that I was requesting his recusal in both cases.
 How about I save you some time and tell you that averment #27 of the Motion for Recusal reads:

 Noel L. Hillman and Karen M. Williams cannot deny that the above averments #5
through #26 unless supported by substantial evidence to the contrary, support and offer
valid grounds for their recusal from civil action’s 1:11-cv-06304 and 1:08-cv-02407.

If there are still some that must see things for themselves because they only believe half of what they hear, well they can click the following link and scroll down to page 9 to see averment #27 at the top of the page.
 I had a very long day, just as many of you have either ahead of you or behind you as well, but there is another case I'd like to share with you so please return and view this show stopper.

About to bump my head on the keyboard, but thanks for viewing,
Gaming Oracle! ZZZzzzzz!

Monday, April 30, 2012

Analysis of Third Circuit Case Law on Recusal Standards


Can Judge Noel L. Hillman claim that the case law I shared with you in "Acting v. Reacting III" only applies to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedures?  By now you know how I do, so here's what the case law within Judge Hillman's Third Circuit says.  You be the judge.
 The key issue stated within  Riga v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline 224 S.W.3d 795 that I pointed out to you within "Acting v. Reacting III" was the settling of the fact that:

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(c) requires a judge who declines to recuse to forward the recusal motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region. Judge Fowler did this. However, Rule 186a(c) further requires that the trial judge may make no further orders and take no further action prior to a hearing on the forwarded motion. The only exception provided by the Rule is if the further order states good cause for ruling notwithstanding the pending recusal motion.

Guess what folks, I'm going to be waiting again, because the above case law say that: (1) Judge Noel L. Hillman should have sent my motion for recusal to the Chief Judge of his Court, (2) he was required to make no further orders and take no further action in 08-cv-02407 and 11-cv-06304 prior to a hearing on the forwarded motion, and (3) the only exception to the above Texas Rule of Civil Procedure is if the further order states good cause for rulings notwithstanding the pending recusal motion.
 But, before you go running of to see if the above was done by Judge Hillman we have to make sure that we are comparing apples to apples as the old saying goes.  Let's not forget that the above is Texas Rules.  So, what is the standard followed within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals?  Well…

On September 22, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, said within United States v. Furst that it was remanding the case back to the district court for reassignment to a different district judge.  See last sentence of "Opinion of the Court" U.S. v. Furst 886 F.2d 558, 561 (1989).
 Please don't yawn yet, or just say "yeah-yeah-yeah, they remanded it so what was the remand based on and how is it applicable here?"  Well here's how.  One reading further into U.S. v. Furst, at page 583 will find that the court said:

As a result of the extent to which the district court confirmed the underlying facts upon which the recusal motion relied, we need not resolve the issue of whether a judge need accept as true the allegations presented in a motion for disqualification under section 455 which asserts a basis as to which section 144 is applicable and which includes an affidavit sufficient under section 144. It is sufficient that we state that where the basic underlying facts as set forth in the affidavit supporting a recusal application are not in dispute, the district court should not minutely examine the movant's characterization of them, and weigh the court's memory of what happened against that of the affiant. We think it simply inappropriate in the circumstances here for the court to have made a credibility assessment of itself. Consequently, we hold that the district judge improperly considered the truth of the asserted grounds for his recusal.

Thus, our remaining inquiry is whether the allegations were "legally sufficient" for recusal. Here we are satisfied that the allegations of the motion and affidavit for disqualification were sufficient to have required recusal, as taking the allegations as true, the judge's impartiality, though only in sentencing, might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). According to the attorney's affidavit, the judge made it clear that he was anxious for a guilty plea and would award a longer sentence to be served in unpleasant circumstances, following a conviction trial. Thus, it was reasonable to conclude, taking the attorney's affidavit as true, that the judge's attitude as to sentence was based at least to some degree on the fact that the case had to be tried, an exercise which the judge seemed anxious to avoid.

There you have it folks, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said in 1989 that, (1)  it is inappropriate for the court  make a credibility assessment of itself, (2) within this Circuit a motion to recuse is guided by the procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, (3) these two statutes say that a recusal motion and it's supporting affidavit that contain legally sufficient allegations are to be taken as true, especially when they are not disputed.
 69 day's after February 21, 2012, Judge Noel L. Hillman has not disputed the allegations of the motion for his recusal.  Yet on March 28, 2012, with a motion seeking his recusal from civil actions 08-cv-02407 and 11-cv-06304, and further proceedings forthcoming within the two civil actions, Judge Hillman did exhibit "willful ignorance" towards the above case law, which is from his own United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
 Okay, now you may refer back to "All-In-All Its Just More JSHIT OnThe Wall" where I shared a link to Judge Hillman's March 28, 2012, invalid opinion.  Now you should have a firm grasp as to why that post was entitled more JSHIT on the wall.  But, if you listened to the included song, which says "we don't need no education," you should agree with me that Judge Noel L. Hillman does need an education.  Why? Because we don't need no dark JSHIT in our courtrooms.

But wait, there's more.  Okay-Okay, I know this is a bit much so I'll continue with more case law that Judge Hillman thumbs his nose to in my next post.  May I ask that, if you agree with the facts that I'm setting forth, will you invite a friend or two to join us? We need all the help and support we can get, because Judge Noel L. Hillman has clearly bumped his head!
 Thank you so much for viewing,
Gaming Oracle!

Thursday, April 26, 2012

All-In-All Its Just More JSHIT On The Wall



Pause music below before clicking.

Day 65, and Noel L. Hillman has yet to move on motion that he recuse himself from civil action 08-cv-02407 and 11-cv-06304. Yet he has slung more JSHIT on the walls of justice, and at some point the people must demand that this injustice be stopped.

Let's look at the facts. Keep in mind that what I state here within this blog does not constitute facts unless I can substantiate said facts with proof's to support them. Hence, whenever I make a claim in this blog a try to support my claim with some form of evidence, just like I've done in the civil actions I'm sharing with you.
I shared with you via "Absolute Immunity via Recusal" that a "28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 Declaration of Bias or Prejudice and Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams" was filed with the Court.  That post has a direct link to the document, and hopefully all that follow this blog have clicked this link to confirm that this is a fact.  If not, by now you know the drill, click the link to the post now...I'll wait.

Fact, averment #27 of the above Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams states:

 Noel L. Hillman and Karen M. Williams cannot deny that the above averments #5
through #26 unless supported by substantial evidence to the contrary, support and offer
valid grounds for their recusal from civil action’s 1:11-cv-06304 and 1:08-cv-02407.

You be the judge, has the court been given notice that the plaintiff's are seeking the recusal of these judges from civil actions 11-cv-06304 and 08-cv-02407? With that set forth, and considering the fact that we are not face-to-face, let me tell you that I have not received any document stating that the motion was given to the chief judge, nor some 65 days after February 21, 2012 have I received anything from judge Noel L. Hillman.

Within "Acting vs. Reacting III" I shared with you that there was a cat to be let out of the bag.  To keep my word, and to try and be as brief as possible, I'm getting to that here, but first I'd like to make sure that all understand that what I am revealing is based upon solid facts.  Said facts have further support in being grounded in decisional and statutory laws and rules.
 When I state the obvious, many will bemoan that I am relating the law of separate jurisdictions, and guess what they will be correct.  In rebuttal I will direct their attention to the fact that there is a concept called "stare decisis" and our court strive to prevent a conflict within the "circuits" of the various United States District Courts.  Any one beg to differ?

In "Acting vs. Reacting III" we saw that In Riga v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline 224 S.W.3d 795 (2007), that court said:

Discussion

The record establishes that Judge Fowler was aware that a second motion to recuse was pending when he signed the March 1, 2006 order granting the plea to the jurisdiction. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(c) requires a judge who declines to recuse to forward the recusal motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region. Judge Fowler did this. However, Rule 186a(c) further requires that the trial judge may make no further orders and take no further action prior to a hearing on the forwarded motion. The only exception provided by the Rule is if the further order states good cause for ruling notwithstanding the pending recusal motion. Here, the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction does not refer in any way to the pending recusal 798*798 motion, much less state good cause for why the order was signed when the recusal motion was pending. Accordingly, the March 1, 2006 order is "void" because it was signed in violation of Rule 18a.

Judge Noel L. Hillman, being the most unethical, and exhibiting the most niggardly application of law, has now set for in black-and-white, proof that he further disregards creating conflict within the circuits, and he is determined to protect Harrah's Hotel and Casino, Atlantic City, from liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
After he was clearly given notice that he was be asked to recuse himself he does not forward the motion to the chief judge, and he proceeds to write an order in a case that he is being requested that he remove himself from.

You were given the facts as to the motion to recuse, and just above I shared with you the law that gives further support to these facts. Now let me share with you the fact that Judge Noel L. Hillman on March 28, 2012 did write another Order and Opinion in civil action 08-cv-02407.  And yes, he does have the "HUBRIS" to publish this invalid Opinion for the world to see at Hickson v. MARINA ASSOCIATES, Dist. Court, D.New Jersey 2012.

At this juncture lets rest in knowing that this fact exists.  I've shared with you what the law says when a judge is asked to recuse himself.  I've told you that this judge said that he would move on the Motion to Recuse on 2/21/2012.  Yet, now as of this posting, some 65 day's past due, I do not have that ruling to share with you. But…
 Lastly, let me share this with all that are not aware of what the law says in relation to a judges handling of the courts business.  Those versed and studied in the law will know that:

ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIALCONDUCT, Canon 2

A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY,
COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY.

  • RULE 2.2 Impartiality and Fairness
 A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial
office fairly and impartially.
  • RULE 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.
  • RULE 2.4 External Influences on Judicial Conduct
(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
 (B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other
interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or
judgment.
 (C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression
that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.
  • RULE 2.6 Ensuring the Right to Be Heard
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a
proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.


Every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, should have the right to be heard according to law. Hmm? Judge Noel L. Hillman exhibits behavior that clearly says these [FN] rules do not apply to his court.  Well, I beg to differ Judge Hillman, and I will proceed to show that you are sling more JSHIT against the walls of justice.

As always, I thank each and every viewer, please tell a friend or two, and if my point is clear send a message to these judges with a simple +1.  Yes, a simple +1 adds up to tell these judges and others that you know what's going on.

Thank You,
Casino Gaming Oracle!

Sunday, April 22, 2012

Acting vs. Reacting III


Another One of "Bush's Boy's" Reveal Bull-JSHIT
Judge Craig Fowler was appointed by Governor George Bush after winning an election for District Judge of the 255th Judicial District of Dallas County.  He took the bench on May 1, 1998.  Not to worry folks, just another "good ole boy, never meaning no harm," nor intending to be honorable as the facts reveal.
 For those of you not clear on why I refer to this judge as one of Bush's boy's, you'll have to see "Cebull #1, Hillman #195 (Bush Appointments)."  Go ahead click it, I'll wait, you know I always do...

Okay, since we're all up to speed, let's proceed.  I bring your attention to another one of Bush's fine appointments because judge Fowler was involved in a case that will show us exactly why Presidential appointment #195, Noel L. Hillman, is reacting as shown in the two civil actions that I am sharing with you in this blog.
This is going to take a minute or two, so plan accordingly.  In Riga v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline 224 S.W.3d 795 (2007), we find the following:

Background
The Commission brought a disciplinary action against Riga, alleging that Riga violated provisions of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and that Riga assisted Easton, his legal assistant, in the unauthorized practice of law. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 3.02, the supreme court appointed the Honorable Craig Fowler, judge of the 255th District Court of Dallas County, to preside over the disciplinary action. Easton filed a plea in intervention, bringing claims against Pamela Halliburton, the Commission's lawyer, and Suzanne Ross, a member of one of the State Bar's grievance committees. Riga filed counterclaims against the State Bar of Texas, the Commission, and Halliburton, seeking monetary 797*797 damages under title 42, United States Code, section 1983 and sanctions under state law. Easton later filed a motion to recuse Judge Fowler.

The State Bar, the Commission, Halliburton, and Ross filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which they argued (1) that Judge Fowler's appointment order did not authorize him to preside over any parties or claims other than the disciplinary action brought by the Commission against Riga and (2) that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over parties and claims outside the disciplinary action. Before taking action on the motion to recuse, Judge Fowler granted the plea to the jurisdiction on May 25, 2005. That order was not appealed.

In November 2005, Judge Fowler referred Easton's motion to recuse to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region, who later denied the motion. Acting in "an abundance of caution" after the denial of the motion to recuse, the State Bar, the Commission, Halliburton, and Ross asked the district court to reconsider its plea to the jurisdiction. Before the district court signed a second order on March 1, 2006 granting the plea to the jurisdiction, Riga and Easton on February 20, 2006 filed another motion to recuse Judge Fowler. The district court's March 1, 2006 order does not mention the pending recusal motion, but in a separate order on March 1, 2006, the district court referred the recusal motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region. The record does not reflect the ultimate disposition of the recusal motion.

I must get this off my chest right away, did you notice how the court referred to the Judicial Stealthy Hubristic Injustice Tactics (JSHIT), as "acting in an abundance of caution."  The judge writing the opinion substantiates the existence of (JSHIT) by that statement, huh?  But that's to be expected, we all act with an abundance of caution when treading through a pasture replete with cow dung. (You know "BS")
 But here's where Judge Fowler really fowls-up.  You see in the very next section of the opinion the above judge show's us why his colleague is not honorable, because he is caught red handed and this judge has no way to tip-toe around this pile of you know what.   224 S.W.3d 795 (2007), goes on to state:

Discussion

The record establishes that Judge Fowler was aware that a second motion to recuse was pending when he signed the March 1, 2006 order granting the plea to the jurisdiction. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(c) requires a judge who declines to recuse to forward the recusal motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region. Judge Fowler did this. However, Rule 186a(c) further requires that the trial judge may make no further orders and take no further action prior to a hearing on the forwarded motion. The only exception provided by the Rule is if the further order states good cause for ruling notwithstanding the pending recusal motion. Here, the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction does not refer in any way to the pending recusal 798*798 motion, much less state good cause for why the order was signed when the recusal motion was pending. Accordingly, the March 1, 2006 order is "void" because it was signed in violation of Rule 18a.

The judge writing the opinion above tell us that according to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure judges refusing to recuse themselves must forward the recusal motion to the presiding judge.  But note that even this judge attempts to soften the blow by saying that "Fowler did this."   Yeah but after the fact.  Oh, that's just an example of that obscure language that Abramoff warned us about, and now we see how the "Bush boy's" utilize this tactic.  (Those not familiar with the Abramoff "obscure language" revelation, go to "Abramoff Should Be Flattered.")

So, by now we all should know why judge Noel L. Hillman's ruling on the motion that he and Magistrate Karen M. Williams recuse themselves has not hit google scholar, nor this writers mail box.  The decisional case law above further reveals the reaction that Judge Hillman will make, yes we can see what they got cooking. 
 Those following this blog early on know that I usually post every day, and lately I have fell-off, why?  Because, as you can see I've been busy doing my research to make sure that judge Noel L. Hillman's latest (JSHIT) Order is void, as was the case in the matter before one of his boy's, Craig Fowler.  Yes, you guessed it I have the "BS" in hand and you don't want to miss this folks.

Please join me next time when I let another documentary cat out of the bag.
 Thank you for viewing and please share at will, a lot of careers could be saved from turning to the "Dark Side." We don't need more judges thinking that the (JSHIT) is with them. You are the force, the people must strike back.

O-B-1-Gaming Oracle!

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Acting vs. Reacting II


Thank you for joining in my posts on Acting vs. Reacting.  This is the second post in the series.  Within the first article "Acting vs.Reacting" I shared the definitions of the terms: (1) act, (2) react, (3) reaction, and (4) acting. 

If you are just joining us on this topic please click the preceding link, so that you will understand the context that these terms are used throughout this discussion of Acting vs. Reacting.
 In this article I submit that Judges Noel L. Hillman, Karen M. Williams, Christopher C. Mauro and DAG, Kathleen M. Bartus are pretending to be moral judicial officer, when the facts are to the contrary.

For our Courts to serve those within its jurisdiction, all judicial officers of that court should take action (MOVE), conduct themselves (BEHAVE), and perform the specific function of the due administration of justice (SERVE), in accordance with the law.

When the judicial officers of a court comply with the above, the public it serves can have confidence in said court.  If a judicial officer is found to "act" contrary to the above, he or she is not upholding their oath to uphold the highest law of the United States of America, the Constitution of the United States of America.
 Those familiar with this blog know that I have filed a motion seeking the recusal of judges Noel L. Hillman and Karen M. Williams.  For those that aren't aware of this fact, or forgot it, you can review this fact at: "Absolute Immunity via Recusal."

Judge Noel L. Hillman, wanting to present the appearance that he is "just," did issue a hearing date of February 21, 2012, to render a decision on the motion seeking his recusal.  The physical evidence supports this act of Hillman's.  But, what is hidden is the fact that said act was nothing but Hillman's "reaction" to conceal his perfidy to uphold his oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America. (I guess such behavior is to be expected from one following in the footsteps of one of his former defendants. See "Abramoff Should Be Flattered.")
 The act of setting the date of Feb. 21, 2012 was made 33 minutes after the motion was filed.  How many lawyers out there can say that they normally receive such a speedy response from a judge. (I'll wait...)  Not to many huh? You'd have to be standing in front of the judge to get a response that quick, even then, you'll have to pray he doesn't call a recess, or it's not to close to lunch.

If judge Hillman writes that he will "take action (MOVE)" on 2/21/2012, why is it that as of April 17, 2012, there is no physical evidence that he has moved on this motion?  Do you agree that justice delayed is justice denied?  Well it was written that the motion to recuse would be moved upon on 2/21/2012.  Yes, that's what was written and it's not what was done. Hence, Noel L. Hillman was acting.
 He was presented with the stimulus, and 54 days after the purported hearing date there is no response. Hmm?  But wait, the plot thickens, or should I say the (JSHIT) deepens. I will reveal further facts that show this judges lack of integrity.  Said lack of integrity going beyond his proselytization of Magistrate Judge Karen M. Williams. (See Proselytization of KMW)
Without an answer to the motion to recuse himself, judge Noel L. Hillman is pretending to serve as a U.S. District Judge, when in fact he is not doing so, and he is not just running a little behind on conducting the business of the Court.   Do you agree?

Thank you for viewing, and please join me for the next post.
Gaming Oracle!

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

Day 43 and Still No Response


The clock is ticking but I'm not one to stand around and wait.
Today Wednesday, April 4, 2012, marks the 43rd day in which United States District Judge Noel L. Hillman has not moved upon a motion that he and Magistrate Judge Karen M. Williams recuse themselves from civil actions 11-cv-06304 and 08-cv-02407 NLH-KMW.

Not more than two days after filing the motion for recusal, I shared with you the viewers of this blog, within "Absolute Immunity via Recusal" the following:

On or before February 21, 2012, U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams may retain their "Absolute Immunity" by recusing themselves from civil actions 11-cv-06304 and 08-cv-02407, which are before the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden vicinage.

Earl Hickson and Markland Grant have filed a ten page "28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 Declaration of Bias or Prejudice and Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L.Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams.  (What is 28 USCA § 1746)  Within 33 minutes of receiving the motion, amazingly the court was able to docket a hearing date of 2/21/2012. The average person would be impressed and say "wow what an efficient and speedy bunch of judicial officer." Not!
 Noel L. Hillman can sure dig some huge holes for himself.  Former president Bush is not in office to send him packing to another state this time, as was the case when he was prosecuting Mr. Abramoff, and Bush gave him his present judgeship to quell that debacle. (See "Archives Opens the Eyes")

Having been denied justice for some 43 days now by this unethical band of judicial officer's I'm in a bit of a quandary. Do I thank my lucky stars that I was only kidnapped and falsely imprisoned for ten days, or do I implement all that's available to me to acquire redress?
 I know Hillman is beyond pissed off, thank God I'm not a lawyer, and I don't to put food on the table by appearing in his court.  In my opinion that fear of loosing her source of income, and or status with the "good ole boys and girls" caused judge Karen M. Williams to yield to the proselytization as discussed within, "Proselytization of KMW."

By now you all know that I am working on getting justice, even if the whole court has to turn itself in, but before that happens I must share the details and doing's of the two "liars for hire."
You won't believe it, but one is a Deputy Attorney General for the State of New Jersey and the other is a partner in a New York law firm located within the Empire State Building.

I'm working on those post's for you plus I have some other projects to share, so I hope you continue to join me here at this blog.  Please continue to spread the word by sharing this site with your friends and associates.  (Check out my updated profile photo and description for a clue as to what's in store.)

Thank You,
The Casino Gaming Oracle!

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Alternative View To A Plea, (part II)


Please pardon the interruption of "Basis In Fact, I'm Not Biased,You," but I thought it was important to share with you the existence of the Implicit Association Test" or (IAT). If you missed the post or you're just joining us you can click the link to catch up to speed.
When we closed the first part of this topic we had discussed what a demand was, and with that taken care of we can now turn to a plea vs. a prayer.  I shared with you that a plea has several definitions. A plea is defined as: 1. a legal suit or action, 2. an allegation made by a party in support of a cause; as (a) an allegation of fact (b) (1): a defendants answer to a plaintiff's declaration in common-law practice (2) an accused person's answer to a charge or indictment in criminal practice (c)  a plea of guilty to an indictment.

The judicial system within the United States of America, especially the criminal side, emphasizes the definition of "a plea of guilty to an indictment." Why?  Aren't we all innocent until proven guilty?  Yes that's true, in a criminal matter we are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
 But, there in lies the catch.  Many may have noticed the litigation in America has become very expensive, and the criminal justice system has been converted into a system of settlements and compromises to defray expenses. So what ends up happening is that most cases result in the plea bargain. In this process a defendant says that he or she is guilty of some charge, which is usually a lesser charge than he or she would face if they went to trial.  But what happens if the person is innocent or the prosecution lacks evidence to prove guilt and the matter is dismissed?

If a matter is dismissed according to the legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.) Vol. 54 Section 45 Termination by dismissal or discharge in criminal prosecution:

C.J.S. Vol. 54 Section 45 Termination by dismissal or discharge in criminal prosecution

Where the dismissal of criminal charges reflects on the merits of the underlying action it constitutes a favorable termination sufficient to support an action for malicious prosecution.

In a malicious prosecution action the plaintiff must establish, among other things that the underlying criminal proceeding was terminated in his or her favor, which is satisfied when the final disposition involves the merits and indicates innocence on the part of the accused.  Accordingly, a malicious prosecution action cannot be predicated on underlying criminal proceeding which were terminated in a manner not indicative of the accuser’s innocence.  However, there is other authority that does not distinguish between dismissals consistent with the innocence of the accused and dismissal on the basis of a procedural or technical defect.

The dismissal of criminal charges may constitute a favorable termination even though future criminal proceedings may be brought against the accused on the same charge, if the prosecutor must institute new proceedings in order to further prosecute the case.  A favorable termination has been held to exist where dismissal is due to a formal abandonment of proceedings by a public prosecutor, the complaining witness’s refusal to testify, a lack or insufficiency of evidence necessary for conviction, a lack of a speedy trial, or a prior grant of immunity.

Because of the above, a plea of guilty causes a waiver of the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the pleader further waives the right to a trial wherein his or her guilt would have had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hence the judge must ask if the pleader understands the rights he or she is giving up, and that said waiver is knowing and not coerced. Why, because the conviction and sentencing is to follow.
 And here is the whole point people, as long as there is a conviction there can be no claim of false arrest, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment.  A conviction also negates any claim of violation of a persons civil and constitutional rights. The short version is, "as long as there is some form of conviction, those accused cannot come back and sue those that initiated the prosecution in the first place.

A classic example of this situation is contained within Prinz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F. 2d 692 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 1983. I'll link you to the case but in a nutshell, Mr. Prinz was arrested by a casino, sent to the Municipal Court in Atlantic City, NJ.  Where he was advised by a public defender to plead guilty and all he would have to do is pay a fine and be done, so he did that. He then filed a lawsuit for false arrest and won, but this verdict was reversed due to his prior guilty plea as evidenced within the first paragraph of the case that states:

Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc. (Greate Bay) appeals from a final judgment of $105,000 in favor of David Prinz in his suit for false imprisonment and assault and battery, and from an order denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The judgment was entered on a jury verdict on special verdict interrogatories, which found Greate Bay liable for assault and battery and false imprisonment and awarded $5,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages. We hold that the trial court erred in denying Greate Bay's motion for a new trial, and we remand for that purpose.

But guess what folks Mr. Prinz was not guilty of any crime, he just fell for some well planned advice from one of the casinos band, just like all those you are hearing about throughout this blog.  Judge Noel L. Hillman has been made aware of this case law and has done all within his power the protect the New Jersey Casino industry from liability from violating their patrons civil and constitutional rights, as this lone pro se litigant has uncovered.
 So as we can see unless you educate yourself about the law, "prayer" will never enter the equation, because you won't stand a prayer when judicial officers are bent of mind upon securing a conviction by all means necessary. You will not have a prayer if you don't learn what rights you give up by just pleading guilty, paying a fine or taking some other sweet deal that will surly not be designed with you in mind, but the protection of eliminating a future lawsuit.

Thank You,
The Casino Gaming Oracle!