On page 12 through
15 of the above brief, averments 17, 18, and 19 are given a basis in fact and
law as follows:
Averments [17, 18, and 19]
Any
reasonable person armed with access to the internet can go to “Google Scholar,”
at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13405143048046505225&q=Hickson+v+Marina+Associates&hl=en&as_sdt=2,31 to find that upon searching for the term
“exhibit” that their search will yield zero matches. This fact substantiates that Judge Noel L.
Hillman has “bent of mind” to ignore Earl Hickson’s exhibits (A) through (Q),
on pages 43 through 77 respectively of Hickson’s “Third Amended Complaint”
of civil action 08-cv-02407.
Justice
Marshall, concurring in the Supreme Court opinion of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79, 107 stated: “Nor
is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only danger here.”[I]t is even
possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself
that his motives are legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own
conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a
prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had
acted identically. A
judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an
explanation as well supported. As
JUSTICE REHNQUIST concedes, prosecutors' peremptories are based on their
"seat-of-the-pants instincts" as to how particular jurors will vote.
Post, at 138; see also THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, post, at 123.
Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may often be just another term for
racial prejudice. Even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the
best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and
overcome their own racism on all levels — a challenge I doubt all of them can
meet. It is worth remembering that "114 years after the close of the War
Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other forms
of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice
as in 107*107 our society as a whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 264
(1986).”
Only Judge
Noel L. Hillman can answer the question as to which hold true in the matters at
bar here, does he hold conscious or unconscious racism against
African-Americans or is he just attempting to conceal his own unethical
favoritism for corporations doing business in the State of New Jersey?
Let’s
present more facts so that reasonable people can judge from these facts. In a case before Judge Hillman a white woman
was arrested and she claims the officers called her a “Cracker.” Did you Judge Hillman document this? Merman v. City of Camden, Dist. Court, D. New Jersey 2010, at “II. Background” states: “Plaintiff's face hit the ground, causing it to throb
and bleed. While lying on the ground,
plaintiff's legs were held down and she felt a knee in her back. Plaintiff was
handcuffed and brought back to her feet. She overheard laughter among the officers, as well
as, what she deemed, "racial slurs," particularly "yuppies"
and "cracker."Plaintiff,
Jennifer Frett, and Lopez were transported to the Camden police headquarters in
different police vehicles. The officers who drove plaintiff to the police station were not
Caucasians.”
Only you
Judge Hillman can explain what the two police officers not being Caucasians had
to do with the matter. Usually a
reasonable person says that these two officers have gone through police
training and education to understand the law of arrest, but the above statement
by you tends to support an inference that these two police officers who were
not Caucasians had no right to drive this white woman to the police
station.
Averment #33
of 08-cv-02407 says: “While he was out, I sat
listening to what are now three to five Harrah’s security officers swap
accounts of how they tackle “niggers and beat up seagulls.” This banter was clearly meant to scare me, so
I stayed on guard, praying to God for strength if attacked.” Does a reasonable person find that you define
the racial slur directed at Earl Hickson on May 15, 2006? Reasonable members of the public can search
your opinion of September 27, 2010 to find that a search for the term “nigger”
yields no match. If this same reasonable
person were to search for the term “seagull” they would come up with zero
matches judge Hillman, what does this leave the reasonable person to infer?
It cannot be
denied that Earl Hickson filed a “Motion for Revision of the Courts 9/27/2010
Order & Opinion Pursuant to FRCVP 54 (b) & 60 (b) & the Prevention
of Manifest Injustice & Denial of Equal Access to the Courts and Protection
of the Laws of these United States.” How
did your court respond to this motion Judge Hillman? A reasonable person given the fact that
docket item [67] should reflect the filing of this motion will find that the
court has attempted to conceal the very heading I gave this motion, as
substantiated by your own court’s docket sheet.
The text description to [67] reads: “MOTION
for Reconsideration of 65 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 64 Opinion by
EARL D. HICKSON. (js) (Entered: 10/12/2010).”
You not only
had to conceal the heading of this document from the public to conceal your
hubris, but you also wanted no one to see page 24 of this document which held:
“Herein lies the major problem that required the above
conduct, for only a judge could attempt to circumvent statutory law that shows
a lack of probable cause in this matter, whether it be the Casino defendants’
or Mark Kosko.
Those statutory laws are
New Jersey Stat. § 5:12-121 and New
Jersey Administrative Code 19:45-1.37C (b), which Hillman cites not once within
the thirty seven pages or fifty two paragraphs of his opinion. These laws were
before the court at:
- Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice [55] @ pg. 33 item #8.
- Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice [55] @ pg. 34 item #11. (19:45-1.37C)
- Brief in Support of Complaint [19] @ pg. 9.
- Exhibit G attached to and included in [36] @ pg. 54. (19:45-1.37C)
- First Count @ #114, #117, #119, #120
- Third Count @ #144, #146
- Fourth Count @ #153
- Sixth Count @ #171, #176
Any
reasonable jury could find that it is not a crime for a patron to play or
redeem credits left on an abandoned slot machine. Especially in light of N.J.A.C. 19:45-1.37C
(b) (1), holds that “Any residual slot credit not played or redeemed by a
patron shall be deemed abandoned; provided however, that any such credit shall
remain on the slot machine until (1) played or redeemed by a patron.”
Judge Noel
L. Hillman, what is a reasonable person to conclude from the fact that you were
asked to revise your 9/27/2010 opinion because you clearly ignored statutory
law and you clearly ignored a request to take “mandatory judicial notice” of
controlling statutory law? Does this
fact support my claim that you are biased and prejudiced against Earl Hickson,
and have bent your mind to the point of willfully ignoring a mandatory notice
of controlling law. Again STOP IT!
Supreme
Court decisional case law, within Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 states: “Second, courts must consider the complaint in its
entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice. See 5B Wright & Miller § 1357 (3d ed.2004 and Supp.2007). The
inquiry, as several Courts of Appeals have recognized, is whether all of the
facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter,
not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that
standard. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 431 (C.A.5
2002); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (C.A.9 2002).”
This “Brief”
has just reached the point of covering the first eighteen averment and it
reveals that you (Judge Noel L. Hillman) have refused to follow the first
sentence of the above Supreme Court ruling for you have not, nor can you claim
to have considered the complaints of Earl Hickson in its entirety. You further attempt to do the same within the
instant action as you continue in the same vein as evidenced by your opinion
being devoid of any reference to the 174 pages of exhibits attached to the
matter at issue. Why Judge Hillman, why?
I know that
you claim that Earl Hickson lacks personal knowledge to make claims in you
court, but then the law say that it (the law) shall be written so that the man
of average intellect can understand it.
Stop kicking pro se African-American litigants Judge Hillman and writing
opinions drafted to make it appear that they have tripped. You are the one stumbling in your own hubris.
STOP!
Within civil
action 08-cv-02407 your court attempts to call the public fool’s, Judge
Hillman. You think and or expect that no
one will be able to see that the numbering of the court’s docket items don’t
add up. A reasonable person counts 9, 10, 11, 12, and then 13. Where is docket item [11] Judge Hillman?
A reasonable
person armed with the fact’s shown within “Exhibit A”
of the 174 pages of exhibits attached to 11-cv-06304, finds on page “12 of 174”
that this accurate and true copy of your court’s docket sheet shows docket
items “9,10,12 and then 13.” Again I ask
you Judge Hillman where is docket item [11].
Is this docket item being concealed to hide that fact from the public
that George Morton submitted to the court’s jurisdiction on 12/17/2008, and
that Judge Joel Schneider knew that he had not submitted answers to civil
action 08-cv-02407?
Does the
above support a reasonable person’s conclusion that your court shows favoritism
to the defendants in 08-cv02407, and bias against the plaintiff? When the attorney representing George Morton
finds herself the subject of an action, in which she would have to answer
claims as to why she is concealing her client’s participation in a scheme to
conceal a kidnapping, and you grant her an a gratia means of avoiding said
answers by attempting to dismiss the complaint, can that not be inferred as
bias against the plaintiff’s?
What
conclusion have you reached, my reasonable viewer, after becoming armed with
the above facts? With just 8 days
remaining in the count down to a recusal, the outcome should be clear.
Thank you
for your time and please tell a friend or two.
The Casino Gaming Oracle!
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