Monday, February 13, 2012

"Bent of Mind" Leads to Straight Injustice

I had a truly blessed weekend, Feb. 10, 2012 to Feb. 12, 2012.  Moving is usually a chore but when your brother calls and it turns into a mini family reunion, all is good.   That taken care of, now  I will continue revealing the basis in fact and law as contained within  my "BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams."

On page 12 through 15 of the above brief, averments 17, 18, and 19 are given a basis in fact and law as follows:

Averments [17, 18, and 19]
Any reasonable person armed with access to the internet can go to “Google Scholar,” at,31 to find that upon searching for the term “exhibit” that their search will yield zero matches.  This fact substantiates that Judge Noel L. Hillman has “bent of mind” to ignore Earl Hickson’s exhibits (A) through (Q), on pages 43 through 77 respectively of Hickson’s “Third Amended Complaint” of  civil action 08-cv-02407.
Justice Marshall, concurring in the Supreme Court opinion of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79, 107 stated: “Nor is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only danger here.”[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. As JUSTICE REHNQUIST concedes, prosecutors' peremptories are based on their "seat-of-the-pants instincts" as to how particular jurors will vote. Post, at 138; see also THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, post, at 123. Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may often be just another term for racial prejudice. Even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels — a challenge I doubt all of them can meet. It is worth remembering that "114 years after the close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in 107*107 our society as a whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 264 (1986).
Only Judge Noel L. Hillman can answer the question as to which hold true in the matters at bar here, does he hold conscious or unconscious racism against African-Americans or is he just attempting to conceal his own unethical favoritism for corporations doing business in the State of New Jersey?
Let’s present more facts so that reasonable people can judge from these facts.  In a case before Judge Hillman a white woman was arrested and she claims the officers called her a “Cracker.”  Did you Judge Hillman document this?  Merman v. City of Camden, Dist. Court, D. New Jersey 2010, at “II. Background” states: “Plaintiff's face hit the ground, causing it to throb and bleed.  While lying on the ground, plaintiff's legs were held down and she felt a knee in her back. Plaintiff was handcuffed and brought back to her feet. She overheard laughter among the officers, as well as, what she deemed, "racial slurs," particularly "yuppies" and "cracker."Plaintiff, Jennifer Frett, and Lopez were transported to the Camden police headquarters in different police vehicles. The officers who drove plaintiff to the police station were not Caucasians.”
Only you Judge Hillman can explain what the two police officers not being Caucasians had to do with the matter.  Usually a reasonable person says that these two officers have gone through police training and education to understand the law of arrest, but the above statement by you tends to support an inference that these two police officers who were not Caucasians had no right to drive this white woman to the police station. 
Averment #33 of 08-cv-02407 says: “While he was out, I sat listening to what are now three to five Harrah’s security officers swap accounts of how they tackle “niggers and beat up seagulls.”  This banter was clearly meant to scare me, so I stayed on guard, praying to God for strength if attacked.”  Does a reasonable person find that you define the racial slur directed at Earl Hickson on May 15, 2006?  Reasonable members of the public can search your opinion of September 27, 2010 to find that a search for the term “nigger” yields no match.  If this same reasonable person were to search for the term “seagull” they would come up with zero matches judge Hillman, what does this leave the reasonable person to infer?
It cannot be denied that Earl Hickson filed a “Motion for Revision of the Courts 9/27/2010 Order & Opinion Pursuant to FRCVP 54 (b) & 60 (b) & the Prevention of Manifest Injustice & Denial of Equal Access to the Courts and Protection of the Laws of these United States.”  How did your court respond to this motion Judge Hillman?   A reasonable person given the fact that docket item [67] should reflect the filing of this motion will find that the court has attempted to conceal the very heading I gave this motion, as substantiated by your own court’s docket sheet.  The text description to [67] reads: “MOTION for Reconsideration of 65 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 64 Opinion by EARL D. HICKSON. (js) (Entered: 10/12/2010).
You not only had to conceal the heading of this document from the public to conceal your hubris, but you also wanted no one to see page 24 of this document which held:
Herein lies the major problem that required the above conduct, for only a judge could attempt to circumvent statutory law that shows a lack of probable cause in this matter, whether it be the Casino defendants’ or Mark Kosko.
Those statutory laws are New Jersey Stat.  § 5:12-121 and New Jersey Administrative Code 19:45-1.37C (b), which Hillman cites not once within the thirty seven pages or fifty two paragraphs of his opinion. These laws were before the court at:
  • Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice [55] @ pg. 33 item #8.
  • Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice [55] @ pg. 34 item #11. (19:45-1.37C)
  • Brief in Support of Complaint [19] @ pg. 9.
  • Exhibit G attached to and included in [36] @ pg. 54.  (19:45-1.37C)
  • First Count @ #114, #117, #119, #120
  • Third Count @ #144, #146
  • Fourth Count @ #153
  • Sixth Count @ #171, #176
Any reasonable jury could find that it is not a crime for a patron to play or redeem credits left on an abandoned slot machine.  Especially in light of N.J.A.C. 19:45-1.37C (b) (1), holds that “Any residual slot credit not played or redeemed by a patron shall be deemed abandoned; provided however, that any such credit shall remain on the slot machine until (1) played or redeemed by a patron.
Judge Noel L. Hillman, what is a reasonable person to conclude from the fact that you were asked to revise your 9/27/2010 opinion because you clearly ignored statutory law and you clearly ignored a request to take “mandatory judicial notice” of controlling statutory law?  Does this fact support my claim that you are biased and prejudiced against Earl Hickson, and have bent your mind to the point of willfully ignoring a mandatory notice of controlling law.  Again STOP IT!
Supreme Court decisional case law, within Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 states: “Second, courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. See 5B Wright & Miller § 1357 (3d ed.2004 and Supp.2007). The inquiry, as several Courts of Appeals have recognized, is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 431 (C.A.5 2002); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (C.A.9 2002).”
This “Brief” has just reached the point of covering the first eighteen averment and it reveals that you (Judge Noel L. Hillman) have refused to follow the first sentence of the above Supreme Court ruling for you have not, nor can you claim to have considered the complaints of Earl Hickson in its entirety.  You further attempt to do the same within the instant action as you continue in the same vein as evidenced by your opinion being devoid of any reference to the 174 pages of exhibits attached to the matter at issue.  Why Judge Hillman, why?
I know that you claim that Earl Hickson lacks personal knowledge to make claims in you court, but then the law say that it (the law) shall be written so that the man of average intellect can understand it.  Stop kicking pro se African-American litigants Judge Hillman and writing opinions drafted to make it appear that they have tripped.  You are the one stumbling in your own hubris. STOP!

Within civil action 08-cv-02407 your court attempts to call the public fool’s, Judge Hillman.  You think and or expect that no one will be able to see that the numbering of the court’s docket items don’t add up. A reasonable person counts 9, 10, 11, 12, and then 13.  Where is docket item [11] Judge Hillman?
A reasonable person armed with the fact’s shown within “Exhibit A” of the 174 pages of exhibits attached to 11-cv-06304, finds on page “12 of 174” that this accurate and true copy of your court’s docket sheet shows docket items “9,10,12 and then 13.”  Again I ask you Judge Hillman where is docket item [11].  Is this docket item being concealed to hide that fact from the public that George Morton submitted to the court’s jurisdiction on 12/17/2008, and that Judge Joel Schneider knew that he had not submitted answers to civil action 08-cv-02407?
Does the above support a reasonable person’s conclusion that your court shows favoritism to the defendants in 08-cv02407, and bias against the plaintiff?  When the attorney representing George Morton finds herself the subject of an action, in which she would have to answer claims as to why she is concealing her client’s participation in a scheme to conceal a kidnapping, and you grant her an a gratia means of avoiding said answers by attempting to dismiss the complaint, can that not be inferred as bias against the plaintiff’s?
What conclusion have you reached, my reasonable viewer, after becoming armed with the above facts?  With just 8 days remaining in the count down to a recusal, the outcome should be clear.

Thank you for your time and please tell a friend or two.

The Casino Gaming Oracle!

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