Pages

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Aggregating Further Showings of Bias


In my previous post I started a detailed analysis of averment [16] of my "28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 Declaration of Bias or Prejudice and Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams," and it's supporting "Brief."  If you are just joining me or missed that posting please refer back to it by clicking its title here. [Details of A Non-Existing Warrant Tells All]

I will now show you why I do not hesitate in telling you that Judge Noel L. Hillman is not fit to sit on the bench in this case or any other case involving a pro se litigant.  Judge Noel L. Hillman, on the surface appears to be a follower of the old school rapper "D-Nice," for he presents an attitude that he will be "taking out you suckers and you don't know how I did it."  Well bad news for Hillman would be that there is a genre call "battle rapping," and when a participant feel's that he has an opponent crushed because his shit is weak, he or she will end the round by telling the opponent he of she is "easy."

Please click to post 28 "A Judge Should be Placed Before 3 Cannons forIgnoring Canon 3," where you will see that I have previously warned that judges will, "find phrases within written case law to support their purported administration of justice, all the while knowing that said citing’s are not made using the full context of said decisional case law."  I will now show you how Judge Noel L. Hillman has done the same, in his effort to make an appearance of the due administration of justice, please do not be fooled.

The second paragraph of averment [16], and object of our analysis today holds:
"You further state at Hickson v. Marina Associates, et al., 743 F.Supp.2d 362, footnote [11], that: “The Court may consider Kosko's investigation report as part of the record. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1294 (3d Cir.1994) (holding that "the district court exercised sound discretion in admitting for consideration" an unsworn police report). Although Hickson disagrees with the conclusions drawn therein, the report essentially repeats facts already alleged or established in the case, i.e., Fedaczynsky's allegations and Hickson's outstanding warrant, and serves principally to show Kosko's awareness of those facts—regardless of their ultimate veracity— at the time when the events of this case were still unfolding.” No other words other than “Bullshit” can fully explain a reasonable person’s reaction to the true facts. "

I may be wrong, and please feel free to correct me if I am, but to apply decisional case law one must understand the full context of the case one is citing.  Ok you lawyers and law students out there help me out here.  Now, those that follow this blog know that I will give you all the facts so that you can make your own reasonable determination. So, lets take a look at what Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290,1294 really holds.  The above sentence that Hillman "jacks" is contained within the following:
"Before deciding whether the evidence suggests a genuine issue of material fact as to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 liability such as to warrant vacatur of the district court's summary judgment order, we must decide first the propriety of the district court's consideration of the PSP Report. The plaintiffs relied virtually exclusively on this report to support the existence of genuine issues of material fact. The plaintiffs did not submit affidavits in opposition to the motion, but did submit the sworn deposition of Pennsylvania State Police Captain Ronald Rostalski properly authenticating the PSP Report. The plaintiffs also submitted excerpts from their own deposition testimony.

We are quite satisfied that the district court exercised sound discretion in admitting for consideration the PSP Report, which is indeed unsworn, authored by an investigator who did not have personal knowledge, and which contains opinion based on hearsay. We note that affidavits in support of summary judgment can be opposed by any admissible evidence, including that contained in "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Rule 56(e) further indicates that the adverse parties' response may be in the form of "affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] . . ." (emphasis added). Thus, while Rule 56(e) makes clear that the appellants were required to submit more than mere allegations in their pleadings to oppose the movants' properly supported summary judgment motions, the evidence submitted showing a material factual issue for trial need not have been in the form of an opposing affidavit, as the defendants contend. Hence it was not incumbent upon the plaintiffs under Rule 56 to submit counter-affidavits, albeit such affidavits could have enhanced the strength of their arguments."

As shown above the reviewing court said that: "Before deciding whether the evidence suggests a genuine issue of material fact...we must decide first the propriety of the district court's consideration of the PSP Report."  The court proceed to show the factors it relied on, which were, as seen above:
  • plaintiffs relied virtually exclusively on this report to support the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
  • plaintiffs did not submit affidavits in opposition to the motion.
  • did submit the sworn deposition of Pennsylvania State Police Captain Ronald Rostalski properly authenticating the PSP Report.
  • plaintiffs also submitted excerpts from their own deposition testimony.
 From the very first complaint that Earl Hickson filed in civil action 08-cv-02407 he never relied on any report of Mark Kosko, one reason could be because he didn't have it, and a second reason is the fact that he relied upon his on good memory of the events he experienced.

Did plaintiff Hickson submit affidavits in support of his motion for summary judgment? Well you be the judge. One having a copy of the prevailing "Third Amended Complaint" finds that the certification on page 42 reads:
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the matter in controversy is not the subject of any other court, arbitration or administrative proceeding.  I further certify that all statements are based on fact and based on prevailing law and all copies of exhibits are accurate and true copies of said documents.  I verify this complaint and certify that it is based upon the first hand knowledge of Earl D. Hickson and at the risk of sanctions and or perjury I pray that the defendants are judged based upon their ability to show my averments to not be based in fact or law and not. I further pray that the trier of the facts see through all attempts as misrepresentation of facts and avoidance of the law and grant a just adjudication of this matter to set forth new law to be followed within the State of New Jersey and guide other jurisdiction to eliminate the Constitutional violations stated here within.

When one files a motion for summary judgment one must include a certification with said motion, and certification statements #37 and #38, found on page 9 of Earl Hickson's certification holds:
  1. I make this Certification with the intention and understanding that same shall be relied upon by a Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden, in evaluating whether to enter an Order granting summary judgment on behalf of plaintiff Earl D. Hickson, setting forth that the court has found defendants Harrah’s Hotel and Casino, Security Officer Vance Thompson, Josh Lechtblau, and George Morton liable to plaintiff for damages and the only remaining issue to be tried by the jury is the amount of damages.

  1. I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
On March 26, 2010 Earl Hickson did sign his "Renewed/Supplemental" Motion for Summary Judgment," by stating:

CERTIFICATION
I certify that all statements are based on fact and based on prevailing law and all copies of exhibits are accurate and true copies of said documents.  I certify that it is based upon the first hand knowledge of Earl D. Hickson and at the risk of sanctions and or perjury I pray that the defendants are judged based upon their ability to show my averments to not be based in fact or law. I further pray that the trier of the facts see through all attempts as misrepresentation of facts and avoidance of the law and grant a just adjudication of this matter to set forth new law to be followed within the State of New Jersey and guide other jurisdictions to eliminate the Constitutional violations stated here within.

As established within "Aiding and Abetting From the Bench (part II)," Judge Noel L. Hillman said that these were the prevailing documents in the case. So, why have I drifted into being so long-winded here, Judge Hillman is "EASY," but I want you to know how I'm taking this sucker out, ebonically speaking that is. Please stay with me on this, just a few more paragraphs, OK?

All of Earl Hickson's document were submitted under penalty of perjury, pursuant of 28 USC § 1746, which holds:

28 USCS § 1746. Unsworn declarations
 Whenever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writhing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:

In civil action 08-cv-02407 there was only one valid deposition taken, and that was the deposition of the plaintiff, Earl Hickson.  Christopher C. Mauro claims to have taken another deposition, but Judge Noel L. Hillman knows that did not occur, and it is part of the reason he chose to sit on 11-cv-06304, and attempt to dismiss that case in an effort to prevent that truth from being revealed. [EASY]
 To drive my point home, and or put a wooden stake through this vampire's heart, the case law above that Hillman "jacks" clearly says that the report of the State Trooper was authenticated by a sworn deposition, please will someone ask Judge Noel L. Hillman where's the [FN] sworn deposition of Mark Kosko, or any other named party in the complaint for that matter. [EASY]

The case law above, is the opinion of the Third Circuit Court, which has jurisdiction over Judge Hillman's unethical courtroom, and makes their decision mandatory pursuant to the doctrine of "stare decisis."  The lawyers and law students out there know there should be hell to pay when an attorney misrepresents decisional case law, as held within the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Judge Noel L. Hillman has just been shown to not be a professional, [EASY], do you agree?

Thank you oh so much for all your time,
The Casino Gaming Oracle!

No comments:

Post a Comment