Tuesday, December 6, 2011

A Judge Should be Placed Before 3 Cannons for Ignoring Canon 3?

Why is Judge Noel L. Hillman presiding over civil action 11-cv-06304 when the complaint cites him as a non-party coconspirator?  Judge Hillman's name appears in the complaint some 46 times, and not due to honorable actions, ministerial acts or the carrying out of his judicial duties.  This Judge is cited for turning his back on the due administration of the law.

Over confidence has led him to make public, his and his cohorts efforts to protect Harrah's Hotel and Casino, Caesars Hotel and Casino Atlantic City from answering before a jury as to their liability pursuant to Section 1983.  Knowing that his fellow cohorts have fumbled the ball several times, Judge Hillman now attempts to dismiss a well pleaded claim of "Fraud upon the Court" and "Denial of Equal Access to the Court."

Within the "Continuing Objects and or Goals of This Civil Conspiracy" at (I) on page 9, the complaint states: "I.  Utilization of Judge Noel L. Hillman’s and Robert B. Kugler’s positions whereby they [the judges] can willfully ignore applicable New Jersey laws and regulations that regulate New Jersey casinos, find phrases within written case law to support their purported administration of justice, all the while knowing that said citing’s are not made using the full context of said decisional case law.  Yet the judges being able to conceal their affinities for New Jersey casinos and the State itself , would bear the cross of allowing misconduct within their courts, accept forged documents, ignore clear issue of facts, ignore relevant and controlling facts such as the formation of aleatory contracts, abandonment and judicial notice of persuasive decisional law and relevant statutes of New Jersey’s Casino Control Act and New Jersey’s Administrative Code (Title 19) relating to the regulation of New Jersey casinos."

Averment # 77 of the complaint on page 22 states: "77.  All the answering defendants must admit that Hillman and Kugler exhibit two approaches at administering justice.  Hillman does not require the filing of a Notice of Appearance by defense counsel, while Kugler will allow phantom clerks of the court to enter Notice of Appearances by two attorney’s purporting to represent one in the same defendant."

If the above two averments do not make it plain that Judge Hillman is a co-coconspirator who is now attempting to cover the gangs tracks, the First Count of the complaint spells it out.  Averment # 116 on page 30 clearly states: "116.   Kathleen M. Bartus, Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Bruce Weeks, Non-party co-conspirators Judge Noel L. Hillman, Judge Robert B. Kugler, Judge Joel Schneider, Deputy Clerk of the Court Nick Fanelle, Clerk of the Court and or judicial officer “TH” and other phantom clerks of the court that fail to enter their initials on the docket are State actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983."  That’s my basis in fact, so what does the law say?

The Supreme Court of the United States has set forth the history on when a judge should or should not sit.  Liteky et al.  v. UnitedStates, 510 U.S. 540, 544, holds: "Required judicial recusal for bias did not exist in England at the time of Blackstone. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries. Since 1792, federal statutes have compelled district judges to recuse themselves when they have an interest in the suit, or have been counsel to a party. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11,1 Stat. 278. In 1821, the basis of recusal was expanded to include all judicial relationship or connection with a party that would in the judge's opinion make it improper to sit. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643. Not until 1911, however, was a provision enacted requiring district-judge recusal for bias in general." This history was cited in 1994.

After citing the above Liteky v. U.S. supra. @ 546-547, holds:
"To understand the arguments pro and con it is necessary to appreciate the major changes in prior law effected by the revision of § 455 in 1974.
Before 1974, § 455 was nothing more than the then-current version of the 1821 prohibition against a judge's presiding who has an interest in the case or a relationship to a party. It read, quite simply:
"Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein." 28 U. S. C. § 455 (1970 ed.).
The 1974 revision made massive changes, so that § 455 now reads as follows:
547*547 "(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
"(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
"(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
"(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
"(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
"(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
"(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
"(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
"(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
"(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
"(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding."

Ready--Aim--Fire!  Fast forward to 1999, Russell v. The State.  Steele v. The State, 236 Ga. App. 645,651 holding: "But it is elementary that one may not be a witness and a judge in the same proceeding.  Collins v. State, 141 Ga. App. 121, 122-123.  And Canon 3 directs judges to "disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Canon 3 required the trial judge to disqualify himself in this case, if not sua sponte, then certainly when his impartiality was drawn into question during the hearing."

Please do not forget this last piece of decisional case law.  The Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, stated IN THE MATTER OF OPINION No. 653 OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 132 N.J.124,132 holding: "In assessing the reasonable basis for the appearance of impropriety, the Court adopts the perspective of an informed citizen."

I'm not "Batman" but, citizen, you have been informed.  Should all three cannons be fired?  I thank you for your time and await your igniting comments.

Black History Month 2012 reigns in and all still do not have equal protection of the laws and meaningful access to the Courts of these United States of America.

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