Absolute Immunity via Recusal (part three)

The "Specific Facts and Reasons for Belief that Judges are Biased or Prejudiced" begin with averment number five of the "28 U.S.C.A. §1746 Declaration of Bias or Prejudice and Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams," and proceeds through averment twenty eight of Earl Hickson and Markland Grants motion.  [Scroll to page 3 after clicking link]

 A basis in law is set forth within the document itself when the plaintiffs say: "Unlike U.S.D.J. Stephen C. Robinson, who claimed not to know of five relevant facts in Levine v. Gerson, 334 F. Supp 2d 376, 377, judges Noel L. Hillman and Karen M. Williams cannot deny that they individually and collectively knew the following:" 

If a so-called-impartial judge will state for the world to see that a plaintiff lacks "personal knowledge" to make his claims he damn well will claim that his interest in the matter is not direct.  For those not trained in the law let me briefly explain that I had to research all of the possible "outs" these judges would attempt, understand these out's and eliminate them with undeniable facts.  Hence each averment is drafted so that the judges must either admit or deny the statement, and if denied provide evidence in support of said denial.  That's only fair right, don't I do the same here within?

Thank goodness the Levine decision was not a long drawn out opinion. I was able to find that within Levine v. Gerson, 334 F. Supp 2d 376, 377 the court held: "§ 455 (a) provides that a judge shall "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Courts have held recusal to be appropriate when a judge "expresses a personal bias concerning the outcome of the case at issue." United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1992), citing United States v. Diaz, 797 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir.1986). Additionally, recusal is warranted when a judge has a "direct personal or fiduciary interest in the outcome of the case."

 From the above we see that the court held three things, (1) § 455(a) provides that a judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, (2) recusal to be appropriate when a judge "expresses a personal bias concerning the outcome of the case at issue, and (3) recusal is warranted when a judge has a "direct personal or fiduciary interest in the outcome of the case. In a nutshell we are told when a judge shall, when it is appropriate, and when recusal is warranted.

One quick note on the above is needed so that all can see and understand its interpretation as I have.  As previously stated within "Earl Hickson v Marina Associates," "Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 57.2. Criteria for classifying as mandatory or directory", holds: "The question whether a statutory provision has a mandatory or directory character is one of statutory construction.  To determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory, effect must be given the entire statute, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.  The same criteria applicable to decisions of other kinds of issues of statutory construction apply, i.e. the intent of the legislature or the manifested meaning of the statute.  For example, "Shall" is considered presumptively mandatory unless there is something in the context of the character of the legislation which requires it to be looked at differently."

Each averment of the motion that is not denied and supported with evidence in support of such a denial will bring into question theses judges impartiality, as will the sum total of the averments, create the same question of impartiality.  The mutilation, removal, and destruction of documents filed in the court, the willful failure to seal summonses issued by the court, and the judges clearly being shown not to take mandatory judicial notice of controlling NJ laws supports a reason for the judges to outwardly express, by their actions a personal interest that the matter not proceed as it risks revealing their personal interest, misconduct and treason. That's right "treason," when a judge goes to war against the Constitution of the United States of America that's treason, especially considering that a judge within the U.S. District Court has taken an oath to uphold said constitution.  A reasonable person could further see that there is a risk of said judge being removed from the court and appropriately disbarred, which is clearly worthy of being personal in nature as now the all might dollar comes into play.

 Now having a solid foundation laid, and praying that you all are with me, lets see what these judges are asked to admit or deny, and the basis in law that supports each fact.  We will do this in the next part, as I have already became long-winded.

I thank you for your time, stay tuned and tell a friend or two,

The Casino Gaming Oracle!

Black History Month 2012 reigns in and all still do not have equal protection of the laws and meaningful access to the Courts of these United States of America.