Earl Hickson and
Markland Grant are plaintiff's in civil action 11-cv-06304, within the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden, vicinage. U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen
M. Williams, judges of the court in which this action was commenced, is now
pending, and before whom it proceeded, have a personal bias and prejudice
against the above named plaintiff’s and in favor of Harrah’s Hotel and Casino,
Caesars Atlantic City Hotel and Casino, Christopher C. Mauro, Russell L.
Lichtenstein, Kathleen M Bartus, and the other defendants named in this action.
As always, I want
you to know the basis in law upon which I stand, and in this instance Patterson v Mobile Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 484 says:
"When considering a claim under § 455(a),
we must consider "whether a reasonable and objective person, knowing all of the facts,
would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." In re Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added). This
is because the goal of this provision is to "avoid even the appearance of
partiality." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
recusal may be required even though the judge is not actually partial. In re Cont'l Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259,
1262 (5th Cir.1990)."
I am asking
that you be the judge, you are
reasonable right? I am providing you with the facts, right? Once you have these facts, please take a seat, and ask
yourself "have these fact's lead me to believe that these two judges are
not being impartial to these plaintiff's?"
We should also
remember that the decisional case law of Levine v Gerson, 334 F.Supp. 2d 376, says: "Unlike
a § 455 disqualification, which may be invoked by a motion of a party or by the
judge sua sponte, § 144 is triggered by an affidavit of a party, which affidavit must
be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record. Pursuant to § 144, a district judge must recuse himself if the
affidavit states that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice either for or
against one of the parties, and provides facts and reasons supporting the
statement that the prejudice or bias exists."
On page 3 of the
"28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 Declaration of Bias or Prejudice and Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams," we see at the very top of the page that it says:
" Earl D. Hickson and Markland K. Grant, in accordance with 28 U.S.C.A. §
1746, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury that:" Whereby the
averment's are declared and now the signing of the same by the plaintiff's meet's
the same requirements of an affidavit.
[See (What is 28 USCA § 1746) to better
understand how declaration under penalty of perjury meets the standard of an
affidavit].
The above covers all
the requirements and brings us to the "Specific Facts and Reasons for
Belief that Judges are Biased or Prejudiced," which are set forth within
averments #5 through #29, and will be covered in the following subparts to "Absolute
Immunity via Recusal." Please be
sure to join me in the next posting as it will start to get juicy, but sad that
these two judges cannot deny the fact's to come.
I Thank you as
always, and ask you to tell a friend or two,
The Casino Gaming
Oracle!
P.S. Now
you and the friends can also join my "Pro Se HQ Group" at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/prosehq,
or click "Yahoo Groups join Now" on left.
Black History Month 2012 reigns in and all still do not have equal protection of the laws and meaningful access to the Courts of these United States of America.
Black History Month 2012 reigns in and all still do not have equal protection of the laws and meaningful access to the Courts of these United States of America.
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