Absolute Immunity via Recusal (part two)

Earl Hickson and Markland Grant are plaintiff's in civil action 11-cv-06304, within the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden, vicinage.  U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams, judges of the court in which this action was commenced, is now pending, and before whom it proceeded, have a personal bias and prejudice against the above named plaintiff’s and in favor of Harrah’s Hotel and Casino, Caesars Atlantic City Hotel and Casino, Christopher C. Mauro, Russell L. Lichtenstein, Kathleen M Bartus, and the other defendants named in this action.

As always, I want you to know the basis in law upon which I stand, and in this instance Patterson v Mobile Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 484 says: "When considering a claim under § 455(a), we must consider "whether a reasonable and objective person, knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). This is because the goal of this provision is to "avoid even the appearance of partiality." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, recusal may be required even though the judge is not actually partial. In re Cont'l Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259, 1262 (5th Cir.1990)."

I am asking that  you be the judge, you are reasonable right?  I am providing you with the facts, right?  Once you have these facts, please take a seat, and ask yourself "have these fact's lead me to believe that these two judges are not being impartial to these plaintiff's?"

We should also remember that the decisional case law of Levine v Gerson, 334 F.Supp. 2d 376, says: "Unlike a § 455 disqualification, which may be invoked by a motion of a party or by the judge sua sponte, § 144 is triggered by an affidavit of a party, which affidavit must be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record. Pursuant to § 144, a district judge must recuse himself if the affidavit states that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice either for or against one of the parties, and provides facts and reasons supporting the statement that the prejudice or bias exists."

On page 3 of the "28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 Declaration of Bias or Prejudice and Motion for Recusal of U.S.D.J. Noel L. Hillman and U.S.M.J. Karen M. Williams," we see at the very top of the page that it says: " Earl D. Hickson and Markland K. Grant, in accordance with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury that:" Whereby the averment's are declared and now the signing of the same by the plaintiff's meet's the same requirements of an affidavit.  [See (What is 28 USCA § 1746) to better understand how declaration under penalty of perjury meets the standard of an affidavit].

The above covers all the requirements and brings us to the "Specific Facts and Reasons for Belief that Judges are Biased or Prejudiced," which are set forth within averments #5 through #29, and will be covered in the following subparts to "Absolute Immunity via Recusal."  Please be sure to join me in the next posting as it will start to get juicy, but sad that these two judges cannot deny the fact's to come.

I Thank you as always, and ask you to tell a friend or two,

The Casino Gaming Oracle!

P.S.  Now you and the friends can also join my "Pro Se HQ Group" at    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/prosehq, or click "Yahoo Groups join Now" on left.

Black History Month 2012 reigns in and all still do not have equal protection of the laws and meaningful access to the Courts of these United States of America.